The Ability to Read the Mind of Others Is Classified as Which Esp Ability

Eur J Psychol. 2019 Feb; 15(1): 120–139.

Who Believes in ESP: Cognitive and Motivational Determinants of the Belief in Extra-Sensory Perception

Marija Branković

^aDepartment of Psychology, Kinesthesia of Media and Communications, Singidunum Academy, Belgrade, Serbia

Monitoring Editor: Ljiljana Lazarevic and Iris Zezelj

Received 2018 Jun 29; Accustomed 2018 Nov xv.

Abstract

Many people believe in extra-sensory perception, e.k. the power to communicate with thoughts, to sense futurity events or locate radiation with the help of a V-shaped piece of wood. Addressing a gap in research specifically focused on ESP beliefs, nosotros investigated cognitive styles and basic motivations related to these beliefs in two survey studies. The findings advise that a propensity to utilise intuition is the best predictor of ESP beliefs in terms of cognitive style. ESP belief is positively related to fear of death, and this relation is partly mediated past fatalism, i.e. the belief that chance controls one'southward life. ESP beliefs practice not seem to exist perceived as irreconcilable with a rational view of reality nevertheless, they exercise non necessarily provide psychological protection from existential concerns. The implications of the findings in terms of costs and benefits of these beliefs and the possibility to change them are discussed.

Keywords: paranormal belief, extra-sensory perception, intuition, fright of decease, fatalism

The One One thousand thousand Dollar Paranormal Claiming was an offer of 1 million Usa dollars to anyone who tin can demonstrate a paranormal ability under scientific testing conditionsⁱ. From 1964 to 2015, when the competition was terminated, not a single person of over k applicants succeeded in proving their supernatural power. However, contempo studies reveal that around two-thirds of Americans believe in psi phenomena (Rice, 2003). ESP or "psi" refers to extra-sensory perception, i.e. phenomena as telepathy (communicating with thoughts), psychokinesis (the power to move objects without physical contact), precognition (the ability to predict future events), psychometry (reading the by from an object) or dowsing (the ability to locate underground h2o, buried metals and gravesites using dowsing rod). The mutual denominator for all the phenomena in question is that they pause the primal scientific principles known to date (Broad, 1953). The most recent attempts to demonstrate the reality of ESP were made by Daryl Bem (Bem, 2011), merely several labs promptly attempted and failed to replicate his findings (Galak, LeBoeuf, Nelson, & Simmons, 2012; Ritchie, Wiseman, & French, 2012). Since they failed to stand numerous scientific tests (e.g. Enright, 1995) these phenomena are thus considered pseudoscientific or, as other authors prefer to term this "…not empirically attested to the satisfaction of the scientific institution." (Irwin, 2009, p. 16).

The high prevalence of ESP beliefs, fifty-fifty amid well-educated individuals (Rice, 2003; Wuthnow, 1978), calls for a ameliorate understanding of their psychological determinants. In two studies we, therefore, investigated cognitive and motivational determinants of ESP beliefs, more precisely which kind of cognitive mode predicts these behavior and whether they are deeply founded in some basic existential concerns, i.e. fear of decease.

ESP as a Type of Paranormal Belief

Paranormal belief is a term with very broad and varying content. The nearly widely used musical instrument for studying paranormal beliefs (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983, also a revised version Tobacyk, 2004) has been extensively criticized for grouping together different types of beliefs that have different origins and different correlates (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Lawrence, 1995; Rice, 2003; Thalbourne, 1995; Wiseman & Watt, 2004), e.g., belief in God and other religious beliefs, beliefs in ghosts, supernatural healing, precognition, superstition etc. Although authors in the field appear to agree that paranormal belief is a multidimensional phenomenon (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Irwin, 1993, 2009) the verbal number and nature of the relevant dimensions are yet to exist established. However, in previous studies, gene belittling analyses accept ofttimes identified a component that is related to psi or like phenomena (e.yard. Lange, Irwin, & Houran, 2000; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983).

Beliefs in ESP phenomena are interesting because they are seemingly a more "modern" form of paranormal belief, perhaps more in line with the electric current worldviews, compared to more traditional forms of superstitious behavior or religious behavior. For instance, Schouten (1983) found that students espousing ESP behavior did not express negative feelings about the influence of technology in the modern social club (see also Wuthnow, 1978). Supporting this, a recent survey conducted on a representative sample of the US public revealed that 60% of participants expressed their belief in ESP, which makes them 1 of the most prevalent forms of paranormal belief (in comparing with 33% who believe in astrology, 35% believing that extraterrestrials visited the Earth in the past, or 24% acknowledging that they are at least somewhat superstitious; Rice, 2003; come across likewise Irwin, 2009). Some other finding illustrating the prevalence of ESP beliefs is that people tend to interpret their unusual experiences in life in terms of psi, although in almost cases it is possible to rule out this interpretation (Kennedy, 2005).

Traditionally, researchers interested in ESP came mostly from the ranks of parapsychologists and their interest was primarily related to the issue of how belief in ESP affects functioning in ESP tasks (Irwin, 2009). They studied the sheep-goat consequence, that is, the phenomenon that persons who believe in ESP (sheep) are as well more successful at tasks created to demonstrate ESP phenomena, compared to skeptics (goats) (e.g. Storm & Thalbourne, 2005; Thalbourne, 2010). Otherwise, most of the previous research was related to paranormal beliefs in general, and thus have a limited applicability to ESP beliefs specifically.

In this written report, we therefore decided to focus on this specific type of paranormal conventionalities and study some of its psychological foundations. A more thorough agreement of ESP beliefs has implications for the wider debate related to personal, social and political consequences of holding and acting upon such beliefs (come across also Irwin, 2009). It would besides help better delineate the relations of these specific beliefs and the more general category of paranormal belief.

The Nowadays Study

In this manuscript, we will nowadays two studies. Written report one examined whether ESP beliefs can be reliably measured and whether rational or intuitive cognitive styles are ameliorate predictors of these beliefs. Written report 2 examined the motivational foundations of ESP beliefs, in particular, their relation to fearfulness of death and external/internal locus of control. As already argued, since research on ESP has been largely integrated within the study of paranormal conventionalities in general, we will start past presenting the findings from this wider framework and then discuss whether they also employ to ESP, theoretically and (if possible) empirically.

Report 1

Theoretical Rationale

Cerebral Predictors of Paranormal Belief

Previous research suggests that socio-demographic differences business relationship for a very modest pct of the variance in paranormal belief, disproving the "deprivation theory", i.e. the idea that poorer educational and socio-cultural background should brand individuals more susceptible to paranormal conventionalities (Rice, 2003, cf. Haraldsson, 1981; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Wuthnow, 1978). The existent research likewise failed to reveal deficits in critical reasoning ability amongst paranormal believers (Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005; Roe, 1999). Portions of research suggest that it is the individual's cognitive style, rather than cognitive ability or didactics that makes the departure. A propensity for an analytical thinking mode has been shown to negatively predict paranormal conventionalities although this link has been studied near extensively with regard to religiousness or using the undifferentiated measures of paranormal belief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Morgan, 2016; Pennycook et al., 2012; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016). For example, Pennycook and colleagues recently presented a meta-analytical integration of a number of studies which go to show that non-believers are more than analytical and reflexive than believers (Pennycook et al., 2016). The authors argue that a propensity for analytical thinking undermines religiosity and other kinds of paranormal belief because people prone to belittling thinking are readier to critically examine culturally accepted beliefs and renounce them (Pennycook et al., 2012, 2016).

Paranormal belief has likewise been related to more specific deficiencies in rational thinking, such equally misperception of adventure (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Brugger, Landis, & Regard, 1990; Dagnall, Parker, & Munley, 2007) or confusion of ontological domains (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007). However, the existent research suggests that a lack of rationality cannot be the sectional explanation since a large percentage of variance still remains unexplained (Pennycook et al., 2016; cf. Greyness, 1985). Furthermore, different authors, especially developmental psychologists, argue for the important role of intuitive thinking in development and maintenance of paranormal belief, religious belief in detail (Boyer, 2008; Epley, Converse, Delbosc, Monteleone, & Cacioppo, 2009; Kelemen, 2004). In line with this, intuitive cognitive mode has been demonstrated to predict esoteric thinking and superstition (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). Lindeman and Aarnio (2007) too institute that intuitive thinking was the more important predictor of superstition and paranormal belief than analytical thinking.

Cognitive Styles and ESP Belief

A central issue of interest for the nowadays study is whether the previous findings tin can be extrapolated to ESP beliefs in particular. Similar to other paranormal conventionalities, conventionalities in ESP was found not to be related to the reasoning ability (Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005), suggesting that it is differences in cognitive way rather than cognitive power that are of importance. Furthermore, it has been established that ameliorate-educated individuals are in fact more likely to endorse belief in psi (Rice, 2003). Information technology is possible that ESP beliefs have some specific relations to cerebral style. Commencement, it is possible that an analytical cognitive manner can exist related to an interest in and espousing of ESP beliefs, every bit an alternative to more traditional religious and superstitious ones (cf. Morgan, 2016). Some other effect of interest is the relationship betwixt analytic and intuitive cognitive styles. In the cited research analytical style has near frequently been defined equally the propensity to overcome highly salient intuitive solutions to bug (Pennycook et al., 2012), and measured with the cognitive reflection task (Frederick, 2005). This conceptualization has two tacit assumptions, namely that the 2 cerebral styles exclude each other and that the preferred styles identified in a trouble solving context tin be generalized to other issues and domains. Still, information technology is possible that a person with a highly analytical cognitive style in rational trouble solving would notwithstanding lean on the intuition when thinking nearly whether in that location is more to reality than nosotros tin can perceive.

We, therefore, chose to investigate both intuitive and rational cerebral styles. Based on dual system models of data processing (Evans, 2003; Kahneman, 2015; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), Pacini and Epstein (Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) distinguish betwixt a rational (analytical, objective, fact-oriented) mode and an experiential (intuitive, associative, emotional) mode of information processing. The core proffer of the model is that the 2 systems operate independently and then that individuals tin can agree conflicting beliefs arising from the two unlike systems (eastward.thousand. expiry is an irreversible ending of life / the soul continues to exist later expiry). Following this stardom, belief in ESP could be more than closely related to the operation of the intuitive than the (inconsistency) of the rational system, resulting in ESP beliefs existing side-past-side with rational and scientifically based worldviews. In the current study, we wanted to investigate whether analytical or experiential style are significant predictors of ESP beliefs every bit well as which way contributes more to their prediction.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Ii hundred and 50-seven students from the Kinesthesia of Philosophy, Faculty of Media and Communications and Faculty of Mathematics^two in Belgrade participated in a survey written report (43% female person, hateful age 21.94, SD = v.74). Roughly a half of the students (58%) were administered a pen-and-paper questionnaire during classes at the academy, while the remaining participants responded online. Students participated voluntarily and signed (clicked on) informed consent prior to answering the questionnaire.

Instruments

The questionnaire consisted of a short socio-demographic department and 3 scales that were counterbalanced, to prevent any order effects.

Extra-sensory perception belief scale

was developed, which consisted of 12 items with 5-point rating scales. We chose to examine conventionalities in virtually common phenomena related to ESP: telepathy, precognition, dowsing and perception of causality instead of chance. The scale tapped into phenomena shut to the everyday experience that could be interpreted as evidencing ESP (due east.g. I believe that it is not a coincidence that when I intend to call someone, that very person calls me. Or I always feel when a shut person is not feeling well, even when we do not have direct contact). The scale showed proficient internal consistency (α = .85).

Principal component analysis revealed a clear unidimensional construction of this scale (detailed in Table i). The beginning principal component explained 38.7% of the variance and had high loadings (a minimum of .40) from all the items in the scale. The 2nd component explained boosted 9.82% of the variance, and it appears to be a more specific aspect of ESP belief, most closely related to "sensing" events or people without direct contact. Inspection of the Scree plot suggests that the largest departure in the percentage of the explained variance is between the first and second component (the third component explained 8.03% of variance), and then we therefore conclude that the ane-factor solution is the most acceptable for this scale.

Table ane

Cistron Loadings for the Kickoff Principal Component Extracted From the Scale of ESP Behavior

Item	Factor loading
I believe that some people tin sense future events.	.747
I believe that is non a coincidence when the very person I am thinking about calls me.	.741
The alleged parapsychological powers boil down to pure speculation or fraud.	.717
With the help of certain instruments (as dowsing rod), people can find sources of dangerous radiation in the business firm.	.652
I think that the mod science has shown there is no evidence for parapsychological claims.	.649
I believe information technology is possible for people to sense things from the domains across their concrete senses.	.625
When I judge correctly the side on which a coin will lend, I know that it is a event of pure chance.	.615
I tin sense when somebody is watching me from behind.	.610
I believe that profilers accept the power to read the circumstances of a law-breaking from objects.	.562
Fifty-fifty though I practise not know how, I can always feel when a shut person is unwell, without any direct contact.	.537
Sometimes I dream about things that later happen.	.523
I do not believe that dowsing (using metal or tree 5- shaped instruments) is a reliable method of detecting underground water.	.409

Superstition

was measured past the scale developed in Serbian and validated by Žeželj, Pavlović, Vladisavljević, and Radivojević (2009). This calibration taps into the well-nigh frequent traditional forms of superstitious beliefs, e.g. When somebody mentions some unfortunate event, it is adept to knock on forest, for protection. Or I never go under a ladder, even when this is more than convenient for me. It has 20 items with 5-betoken rating scales (α = .89).

Cognitive styles

were measured by a translated version of the xl-item Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). This inventory assesses rational and experiential styles through two dimensions: engagement (motivation to use rational and intuitive thinking) and self-rated power. Rational style is indicated by the endorsement of items equally I am much meliorate at figuring things out logically than most people (ability) or Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life (engagement). Intuitive style is indicated past items equally When information technology comes to trusting people, I can ordinarily rely on my gut feelings (ability) and Intuition can exist a very useful style to solve bug (engagement).

A master component analysis was conducted to explore the structure of the scale since we did non find any previous study using the calibration in Serbian translation. The first ii components (18.11%, sixteen.73%) could clearly be interpreted as experiential and rational cognitive styles, since they had loadings from all the corresponding items from the scales. Scree plot suggested that the largest deviation in explained variance was between the second and the third gene (which explained 5.49% of the variance), and then a 2-gene solution appears to exist the best fitted to the data. However, since the subscales suggested by the authors provided reliable measures of the described dimensions (α = .75 for RA, .78 for RE, .82 for EA, and .78 for EE), and they offered the distinction relevant to the current research question, nosotros used them in the analyses to allow more precise conclusions^three.

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables are presented in Table 2.

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between Variables in Study one

Variable	K	SD	Correlations
			1	2	3	4	5	6
1. ESP beliefs	2.ninety	.75	–	.58**	-.12*	-.05	.32**	.43**
2. Superstition	2.13	.72		–	-.xx*	-.31**	.20**	.25**
3. Rational ability	iii.81	.58			–	.69**	.14	-.09
4. Rational appointment	3.69	.69				–	.12*	-.05
5. Experiential power	three.29	.68					–	.69**
vi. Experiential engagement	two.97	.68						–

While there is a substantial correlation between the superstition and ESP belief scale scores, conventionalities in ESP is endorsed significantly more than than the traditional forms of superstitious beliefs, t(243) = 16.33, p < .001.

Both types of beliefs are related to the dimensions of cognitive styles, as evidenced by the presented correlations. However, it is predominantly the dimensions of the experiential rather than the rational cognitive styles that are related to ESP beliefs. Nosotros further explored the power of cognitive styles to predict ESP beliefs past mode of a regression assay.

Regression analyses revealed that cognitive styles explained 20.4% of the variance in ESP beliefs and that the best predictor was intuitiveness, more precisely the motivation to use intuition (β = .35, p < .001) (detailed in Table three). The cocky-rated rational ability was only marginally significant as a predictor (β = -.fifteen, p = .066). In comparing, cerebral styles explained 16% of the variance in superstition, just the predictors that emerged pregnant were unlike: traditional superstitious beliefs are best predicted past a lack of rational engagement (β = -.27, p = .001) and the self-rated experiential ability (β = .20, p = .018).

Table 3

Results From Multiple Regression Analyses in Study one

Criterion / Predictor	B	SE	β	p
ESP
Abiding	1.75	0.39	–	< .001
Rational ability	-0.19	0.10	-.xv	.066
Rational engagement	0.06	0.08	.06	.467
Experiential power	0.12	0.90	.10	.216
Experiential engagement	0.42	0.ten	.35	< .001
Superstition
Abiding	2.49	0.39	–	< .001
Rational ability	-0.08	0.ten	-.06	.452
Rational engagement	-0.29	0.08	-.27	.001
Experiential ability	0.22	0.90	.twenty	.018
Experiential engagement	0.10	0.10	.08	.340

Discussion

In the present written report, we set out to investigate beliefs in extra-sensory perception, equally ane specific type of the wider category of paranormal beliefs. Nosotros argued that, in addition to further study of the multiple dimensions of paranormal conventionalities and their mutual relations (Irwin, 2009), an arroyo focusing on specific types of these beliefs can be warranted. Our brusque scale developed to measure ESP behavior proved a reliable and relatively unidimensional instrument then we believe its further utilize and refinement tin can exist recommended. To establish convergent and discriminant validity of this scale, we compared it to a reliable measure of more traditional forms of superstitious belief (Žeželj et al., 2009). We accept seen that the scales practise correlate to a considerable extent merely also that the boilerplate scores are higher on ESP behavior than superstition calibration, which means that these beliefs appear to our young participants equally more acceptable than the traditional ones. Importantly, superstition and ESP beliefs showed distinct patterns of relations with the aspects of cognitive styles: while intuitive date predicted ESP, a lack of rational appointment and self-rated intuitive power predicted superstitious beliefs. We tin thus conclude that ESP beliefs are a phenomenon related to other types of paranormal belief (superstition) but can be recognized equally a singled-out and seemingly more adequate blazon, more than in line with the modernistic life. A articulate limitation of the present assay is the fact that the superstition and ESP scales have been adult independently, so that nosotros can discover some overlaps in their contents (e.g. related to foreseeing the hereafter). Future studies need to distinguish more conspicuously between these two dimensions, to achieve optimal discriminative validity.

Now turning to the chief outcome of the nowadays written report, our findings reveal that a propensity to rely on intuition is a more important predictor of ESP belief than a lack of rationality. This is in line with some of the previous research theoretically founded in the idea of rationality and intuitiveness equally contained rather than contrasting thinking styles (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007). At the same time, our findings complement previous studies that defined a rational thinking mode (more precisely, ability) every bit the propensity to overcome intuitive responses (Pennycook et al., 2012). An obvious difference is that our measures relied on self-report rather than more than objective assessment. It can be argued that the fact that rational power did not sally every bit a predictor of ESP depends on the nature of the measure, which does not accept to reflect more objective measures of ability. This remains an issue to be addressed by future studies that should focus more specifically on ESP behavior. Another interesting result would exist examining intuitive power, still, this appears to be a much more elusive construct, difficult to conceptualize and measure considerately.

Our findings thus lend support to a relative independence of intuitive and rational cognitive styles, both structurally (in terms of principal components) and functionally (as predictors of different types of beliefs). Apparently, ESP belief can be side by side with rational and scientific worldviews within the same individual. This could exist either because some individuals exercise not acknowledge a precipitous dividing line betwixt these worldviews or, quite contrary, that they do recognize this division and keep their intuitive arroyo for the domains other than science. As an example of the former stance, we can consider Daryl Bem, the scientist we mentioned earlier in this newspaper. He is at the same time an enthusiastic proponent of parapsychological research and a scientist who adheres to stringent scientific principles of research. An example of the 2nd stance is the arroyo called NOMA (Non-overlapping magisteria; Gould, 1997) advocating treating scientific discipline and faith as independent fields – science every bit providing facts and organized religion as the domain of morality, values and meaning. Future studies should investigate how and why individuals choose to combine this seemingly reverse views. Maybe these worldviews fulfill different psychological needs of the private. In the post-obit study, we will focus on some of these needs and motives.

Study 2

Theoretical Rationale

The Motivational Underpinnings of Paranormal Belief

The ubiquity of paranormal behavior opens up the question of whether they could have some important psychological functions, i.e. serve some basic psychological needs. Existential motives have been proposed as basic motivations of paranormal conventionalities, i.east. the need for pregnant in life, for overcoming uncertainty, establishing (an illusion of) control or diminishing fearfulness of death (Irwin, 1993, 2009; Kennedy, 2005). A frequent motivational business relationship of paranormal conventionalities is that it is primarily motivated by a desire to achieve control over the unusual or uncertain aspects of life (Irwin, 1993). For instance, Rudski and Edwards (2007) examined the apply of superstitious rituals in the everyday life of students and ended that these rituals more often than not occur in uncertain situations, thus providing the students with an illusion of control and a way of coping. Following the same basic idea, an interesting study of the occurrence of psychological papers examining parapsychology through several decades (from 1929 to 1977) institute that unfavorable social atmospheric condition (expressed through both subjective and objective indicators) predicted scientific interest in parapsychology (McCann & Stewin, 1984). Previous findings also suggest a relation between paranormal belief and the external locus of control, i.e. the trend to ascribe events in one's life to external forces (Dag, 1999; Groth-Marnat & Pegden, 1998; Tobacyk & Tobacyk, 1992), although this was not demonstrated for the psi-subscale of the general paranormal belief (e.m. Groth-Marnat & Pegden, 1998).

Previous research besides established a link between paranormal belief and expiry anxiety (Irwin, 1993), still, there is still controversy as to whether this human relationship is positive or negative. In an experimental study, it was found that making thoughts almost personal mortality salient lead participants to report more belief in supernatural agents, coming from both one's own and other religions, as well equally a strengthened belief in divine intervention (Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006). From the opposite perspective, Kennedy and Kanthamani (1995) found that participants who thought they had paranormal and/or transcendent experiences reported a stronger belief in life after death, belief in a higher power and sense of purpose in life too equally decreased fearfulness of death. The authors, withal, did non clearly distinguish what they termed paranormal and transcendent experiences and in particular transcendent experiences appear to be divers circularly, and then that the effects of the experience cannot be delineated from the experience itself (run across p. 251).

Motivations Underlying ESP Behavior

In this study, we chose to focus on the relation of ESP beliefs with death feet and the locus of control, equally representative of the most common underlying motivations suggested past previous research. Theoretically, it can be argued that these motivations are also relevant for ESP belief, that is, that ESP is motivated past a want to better control ane's surround and reduce some basic anxieties. What is more, since death is i of the ultimately non-controllable aspects of life, need for command and fear of expiry appear to exist related. This proposition has received empirical back up from other domains of inquiry. In i study (Fritsche, Jonas, & Fankhänel, 2008) the authors showed that decease feet can be diminished when participants are induced to perceive some level of personal control over the circumstances of the procedure of dying as opposed to those who did not. These findings suggest that the demand for control could exist ane of the crucial components of expiry anxiety.

Reverse to more than traditional superstitious and religious behavior, Davies and Kirkby (1985) bear witness that belief in psi is related to an internal locus of control, at least regarding personal and interpersonal spheres. Irwin (2000) also establish that a component he interpreted as psi beliefs may be related to a heightened desire for control and a confidence that i has the means to control the events in the sociopolitical arena. The latter finding is difficult to interpret, so the writer suggests its further validation. It is apparent from this short review that the relation betwixt the locus of control and ESP conventionalities needs further investigation with more focused and reliable measures.

However, it is questionable whether belief in psi can offering psychological certainty 1 strives for. Some studies suggest that potentially protective function of paranormal belief in facing existential uncertainties and fears could be limited to religious beliefs. In line with this, Tobacyk and Pirttilä-Backman (1992) found a positive correlation between death anxiety and the dimension of paranormal belief related to psi, at least among their Finnish participants. Wong (2009) proposes a sort of a vicious circle of superstition and anxiety in which anxiety leads to superstition, which cannot relieve the feet, thus leading to it becoming even more intensive, which in turn leads to more than superstition and and then on. This reasoning might also be applicable to ESP belief. Psi phenomena suggest a certain alternative perspective on reality and it has been shown that people tend to explicate their unusual experiences in terms of psi (Kennedy, 2005). However, this is non comparable to the sort of more organized worldviews as religion, with articulate values and standards of behavior, and coming with a hope of literal immortality. Therefore, these beliefs might not offer sufficient comfort in facing basic feet.

Based on these combined insights, we wanted to test the idea that ESP beliefs are related to basic existential anxieties, more precisely to the private's chronic level of fright of expiry. Based on previous inquiry suggesting that command is i of the about of import aspects of death feet (Fritsche et al., 2008), nosotros also wanted to examine whether the locus of command would mediate this human relationship, that is, whether a tendency to attribute outcomes in one's life to gamble would mediate the relationship betwixt fearfulness of expiry and ESP beliefs.

We expect that fatalism should mediate the result of fearfulness of death on ESP behavior, since fear of death is proposed to exist the basic existential business organization, which shapes the way in which a person perceives the environment (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997). If fear of death gives rise to a demand to command the surroundings and perceive it every bit less uncertain, fatalism could be one of possible responses or paths through which some people deal with this bones fright (due east.g. believing in destiny alleviates at to the lowest degree some of the fearfulness in dealing with the uncertain future). However, it is besides possible that people more prone to fatalism experience more than fear of death, which, in plough, motivates them to seek to believe in something "more" that is out at that place (e.k. psi phenomena). Therefore, we will also exam this alternative arbitration model (from fatalism, through fear of decease, to ESP beliefs).

Method

Participants and Procedure

Two hundred and twenty students from the Kinesthesia of Media and Communications, Faculty of Philosophy and Kinesthesia of Mathematics in Belgrade^iv were surveyed (66.8% female, mean age 21.34, SD = 3.49). The surveys were administered during classes at the university. Participants read and signed informed consent prior to participation. They were thanked and provided with either oral or written debriefing.

Instruments

ESP beliefs

were assessed using the scale described in the previous study (α = .83). Master component analysis suggested a single-factor solution, with almost the exact same pct of explained variance as in Study 1 (38.64%).

Fear of death

was measured by the 28-item Collet-Lester Fear of Death Scale (Lester & Abdel-Khalek, 2003) (α = .92). The scale was translated for the purposes of the nowadays study by ii independent translators, while the final formulations were agreed upon through discussion. No substantial alter was made in comparison to the original item diction. Participants indicated the degree to which they found different aspects of death and the process of dying troubling, on a 5-betoken rating scales. According to the authors, the calibration consists of four subscales: ain death, own dying, death of (close) others and dying of (close) others. A principal component assay was performed to explore the construction of the scale. The outset component explained the largest proportion of variance (32.85%) and had high loadings (> .46) from all the items included in the scale. Also, the largest departure in the percentage of the explained variance was betwixt the showtime and the second component (second component explained 9.58%, tertiary component half-dozen.59%), suggesting a one-factor solution. Nosotros thus computed a total score indicating the level of fright of death.

Locus of control

was measured by the multi-dimensional IPC (Internality, Powerful Others, and Adventure Scales) (Levenson, 1981), a 24-item instrument with 6-point rating scales, ranging from -three (do not agree at all) to +3 (fully agree). This calibration was intended to offering a more differentiated measure of locus of control, an individual's chronic tendency to interpret the events in his or her life equally mostly dependent on the individual him- or herself (internal locus) or dependent on external factors, such equally take chances (fatalism) or the will of powerful others. A principal component analysis suggested that the first extracted component explained the largest percentage of variance (25.59%) while the second and the tertiary component explained 10.40% and vii.40% of variance, respectively. Factor loadings suggest that there is a common, bi-polar dimension, underlying this construct. Yet, since the previous research highlights the part of the perception of chance or fatalism equally a specifically important determinant of paranormal belief, we computed the scores for the three subscales, internality (α = .68)⁵, powerful others (α = .84), and chance/fatalism (α = .73), according to the original instruction (Levenson, 1981) and divided the sums with the number of items.

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables are presented in Tabular array 4.

Table 4

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between Variables in Study 2

Variable	M	SD	Correlations
			1	2	three	4	5
1. ESP beliefs	3.09	.76	–	.28**	.05	.29**	-.03
2. Fear of death	three.40	.73		–	.sixteen**	.33**	-.12*
iii. IPS powerful others	1.41	.91			–	.43**	-.42**
four. IPS fatalism	2.51	.98				–	-.29**
five. IPS internal	1.93	.63					–

As can be seen from the table, belief in ESP was positively related to fear of death and the dimension of the external locus of control related to the perception of chance / fatalism, but not to the dimension of powerful others or internality. Likewise, fear of decease was positively related to fatalism equally well as the other external dimension of "powerful others" while being negatively related to internal locus of control, in line with previous research relating fear of death to a lowered sense of control (Fritsche et al., 2008).

We farther explored the relations among the variables using Process macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Since simply the fatalism subscale correlated with ESP beliefs, we entered this variable in the arbitration analysis. Mediation assay showed that fear of death and IPS fatalism subscale explained 12% of the variance in ESP belief scores, F(209, 2) = 14.07, p < .001, (Effigy 1). Death fear had both a direct (b = .22, SE = .07, 95% CI [.07, .36]) and an indirect effect on ESP beliefs, that is, this relation was partially mediated by the tendency to aspect events to chance (b = .08, SE = .03, 95% CI [.03, .15]).

Effigy 1

Relations between ESP beliefs, fatalism and fear of death.

We as well tested the alternative model, in which fatalism is entered every bit the predictor and fear of death as the mediator. This model too showed partial mediation, withal, the event sizes were slightly smaller compared to the previous model: the straight path from fatalism to ESP (b = .xvi, SE = .05, 95% CI [.06, .27]), and the indirect path through fear of death (b = .06, SE = .02, 95% CI [.02, .10]).

Discussion

In this written report, we addressed some important motives underlying ESP beliefs. We established a positive relation of ESP conventionalities with decease anxiety as well as the propensity to attribute events in life to chance. Moreover, fatalism partially mediated the effects of death feet on ESP. The findings are in line with the rare studies that investigated the relationship between fright of death and forms of paranormal belief other than religious (Tobacyk & Pirttilä-Backman, 1992; Wong, 2009). These findings need to be distinguished from those related to more traditional religious beliefs that have typically exhibited a negative relation with decease anxiety (due east.one thousand. Tobacyk & Pirttilä-Backman, 1992; Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006).

The present findings speak to the conclusion that ESP beliefs are at least partly driven by some primal existential concerns, as facing the uncertainty of beingness and expiry. A relevant theoretical framework to understand this relation is offered by terror direction theory (TMT; TMT, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Pyszczynski et al., 1997; Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2015; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004). This theory posits that elementary defense force mechanisms equally negation or rationalization exercise non suffice to avert fear arising from the awareness of mortality and that people, therefore, need to lean on more elaborate symbolic defenses. Complex cultural worldviews are potent plenty to offer solace and a hope of individual transcendence to people who espouse them and strive to attain self-esteem inside the standards they ascertain. Religion has a detail importance equally a defensive structure, owing to its direct relation with the promise of afterlife and immortality (Vail et al., 2010). For instance, it has been shown that offer proof of literal immortality (existence of an afterlife) buffers other defensive reactions to mortality reminders (Dechesne et al., 2003).

A like logic can be extended to the role of ESP behavior, as a sort of belief in invisible forces that speak about a reality that is beyond our senses or reason. From terror direction perspective, the allure of such beliefs tin can exist explained by the want for transcending the limitations of the mortal self. However, since these beliefs are only loosely related to a sense of an afterlife or supernatural agents, they could non be as effective a defense as the more than traditional religious beliefs. Thus, they could exist driven past similar motivation simply not offer the same kind of psychological protection. Since the data at hand are correlational, the verbal causal pathways are not possible to establish: one the one paw, information technology makes sense that more fear creates more need to believe in ESP (amid other things); on the other, stronger belief could also lead to more fright, which is at least partly consistent with some previous studies including people who had unusual experiences (Kennedy & Kanthamani, 1995). Moreover, both directions could, in fact, combine and result in what Wong (2009) describes a vicious circle of feet creating more belief, which, in turns, does not succeed in relieving the anxiety.

Equally the relation between ESP beliefs and fear of death was partly mediated past fatalism, i.e. conventionalities that run a risk controls one'south outcomes in life, this appears to be one of the relevant concerns addressed by these behavior. The less i feels 1 can control the events in life and environment, the more alluring do ESP beliefs become as at least some kind of framework for understanding reality. The nowadays results are thus consistent with previous research relating at paranormal belief with the need for control (Irwin, 1993, 2000; Rudski & Edwards, 2007), besides as the external locus of control (Dag, 1999; Groth-Marnat & Pegden, 1998; Tobacyk & Tobacyk, 1992). The present findings further specify this locus, as well every bit its relations with other basic motivations. As mentioned, the exact nature of relations between fright of death and fatalism every bit determinants of ESP belief needs further, preferably experimental, inquiry.

The findings are as well in line with the studies washed by Fritsche and colleagues (2008), showing that a demand for control can underlie fearfulness of decease. However, since the mediation nosotros established was only partial, there appear to be other relevant aspects of death fearfulness equally a basic motivation for ESP. They could also address the need for meaning in life, in suggesting the possibility that there is a wider or a transcendent reality beyond ours. This potential source of motivation should be explored in future studies.

General Discussion

As the two studies reveal, ESP beliefs can be conceptualized and measured as a coherent and a relatively distinct set of paranormal behavior. These behavior appear to exist more strongly related to an intuitive cerebral style than (a lack of) rationality. In line with the dual-procedure models of data-processing, these behavior are thus not irreconcilable with a rational worldview, rendering the well-educated individuals susceptible or even particularly inclined to them (Pennycook et al., 2012; Rice, 2003). The findings related to the motivational underpinnings of these beliefs suggest that these behavior have some very basic motivational foundations and also that their psychological office tin be ambivalent (Wong, 2009). Apparently, ESP beliefs could be traced back to a psychological need to business relationship for some aspects of reality that one cannot readily sympathise or command and perhaps an expression of the fear of the unknown. With this initial study, we promise to contribute to a more focused and elaborate study of this specific type of paranormal conventionalities, as a complementary approach to the study of the multidimensionality of paranormal belief in general (Irwin, 2009).

A reader of literature on ESP phenomena gets easily struck past a certain duality in research that could be traced back to whether the researchers are skeptics or believers (e.g. Irwin, 2009; Kennedy, 2005). We can hold with that ESP belief tin exist studied regardless of whether one thinks ESP phenomena actually be (Irwin, 2009). However, there are two inevitably controversial issues that we would similar to briefly touch on upon: the costs and benefits of ESP beliefs, and, relatedly, the possibility to alter them.

As regards the costs and benefits of holding ESP beliefs, 1 of import aspect is their consequences for private well-being. Whether or not ESP phenomena are existent, people might experience consolation or a sense of pregnant believing in them – along the lines of the literature supporting the utility of illusions (e.yard. illusion of control, Langer, 1975; Taylor & Brownish, 1988, 1994). The research on this is still scarce and without conclusive prove. We have mentioned ane written report in detail that explored the effects of the (cocky-reported) unusual experiences (Kennedy & Kanthamani, 1995) and concluded these effects are predominantly positive – related to a heightened sense of pregnant, belief in an afterlife and supernatural agents. However, these positive effects were not reported by each individual and, furthermore, 45% of participants also reported that these experiences caused fearfulness. The current findings are consequent with those less favorable outcomes: ESP behavior can arise from a demand for more than certainty and control but fail to offering it. More research is clearly needed to support (or refute) this. Another important attribute of the costs-and-benefits event is the wider socio-political consequences. Although ESP beliefs in their ain might appear more intimate and less related to the political realm, they could also larn more societal provenance. This could happen in particular under conditions of social unrest and uncertainty, equally evidenced, for instance, past a proliferation of seers and magical healers in Serbia in the turbulent decade of nineties. In such circumstances, these beliefs and resulting behaviors can hands be manipulated towards political motives and aims, for instance providing alternative (e.g. supernatural) explanations for the current social events.

The 2d issue is the stability or, put differently, the possibility to change ESP beliefs. This is a clearly controversial effect for the parapsychologists, which would merits there is no need to alter them and that the mainstream scientists should consider changing their dogmatic skepticial views (Kennedy, 2005). Although in that location is a possibility that skepticism can outgrow its ain benefit (Blackmore, 1992) one can certainly hold that acting on whatsoever belief that defies rational reflection or scrutiny might go problematic, both for individual and for the society. The nowadays findings do speak to the relative stability of the ESP in that they a. are non reducible to a deficit in reasoning that tin can easily be unlearned, b. accept some bones motivational foundations. The previous attempts to educate students into a more than disquisitional stance towards paranormal claims accept had at least some brusk-term favorable effects in developing more skepticism (Banziger, 1983; Grayness, 1985; Manza et al., 2010). Such efforts might also benefit from an open discussion of the motives and needs that these beliefs fulfill, with the expectation that achieving insight into one'due south beliefs would make a person more than reflective and less uncritically attached to them. This expectation should be tested experimentally.

Limitations of the Present Study and Suggestions for Further Investigations

The present studies have of import limitations. As they were correlational in design, they do not allow drawing any causal conclusions and further experimental studies are needed to more than conspicuously plant these. Likewise, the present studies revealed just some of the important determinants of ESP beliefs, and future studies should include other variables. Other determinants might be related to the social context, both wider socio-political contexts (McCann & Stewin, 1984) besides as more immediate interpersonal context (Markovsky & Thye, 2001). For instance, participants were more than likely to limited conventionalities in the energy of a pyramid vs. an ordinary shaped cardboard box to preserve the freshness of fruit when other people also expressed it (Markovsky & Thye, 2001).

The issue of cross-cultural specificity of paranormal belief has yet to be addressed thoroughly, although some of the initial studies do suggest a degree of cultural specificity (Tobacyk & Pirttilä-Backman, 1992; Tobacyk & Tobacyk, 1992). The present studies are likewise interesting in that they study ESP beliefs in a specific socio-cultural setting, one characterized by high and ascension levels of religiosity (Blagojević, 2013; Dušanić, 2007). Therefore, information technology might be interesting to study ESP beliefs in relation to religious beliefs and identification in time to come studies. With these initial studies, we hope to take contributed to agreement of the psychological bases of ESP belief, equally a specific and a highly prevalent form of paranormal belief in the contemporary gild.

Acknowledgements

I would similar to thank my student, Antonije Jojić, for his help with the translation of instruments and data collection for the second study.

Biography

•

Marija Branković obtained her PhD from the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade in 2016. She is working equally an banana professor at the Faculty of Media and Communications, Singidunum University, Belgrade. Her inquiry interests focus on intergroup relations, social identities, terror direction strategies, cocky enhancement, persuasion and argumentation.

ⁱThis was offered past James Randi Educational Foundation https://web.randi.org/

^twoOf the full sample, 114 were students of archaeology, 107 students of psychology and 36 students of programming.

³The ability and appointment subscales within both experiential and rational styles did correlate highly, but this did not lead to multicollinearity issues, as evidenced by the relevant indices (tolerance statistics ranged between .47 and .53).

^ivThere were a total of 134 psychology students, 62 archaeology students and 23 students of programming. A non-parametric median comparison did not reveal significant differences in the level of ESP beliefs among students from different fields. Also, exclusion of the students of programming from the sample did non change the findings. Nosotros therefore written report the analyses conducted on the whole sample.

^vOne item was removed that did not correlate with the full score (The number of friends I have depends on the kind of person I am.), to accomplish sufficient reliability.

The writer has no funding to report.

The author has declared that no competing interests exist.

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Source: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6396695/

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